

O F
LIBERTIE
AND
NECESSITIE

A TREATISE,
Wherein all Controversie concern-
ing *Predestination, Election, Free-
will, Grace, Merits, Reprobation,*
&c. is fully decided and cleared,
in answer to a Treatise written by
the Bishop of *London-derry*, on
the same subject.

By *Thomas Hobs.*

Dedicated to the Lord Marquess
of *Newcastle.*

L O N D O N,
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To the Sober and Discreet Reader.



I made S. Chrysostome
tremble when ever he
reflected on the proporti-
on, which those that went
the narrow way, bore to
those which marched in the broad, how
many were the Called, & how few the
Chosen, how many they were that were
created for and in a capacitie of eter-
nal beatitude, and how few attained
it. This consideration certainly would
make a man look upon the holy Scrip-
tures, among Christians, as the greatest
indulgence of heaven, being all the di-
rections it hath been pleased to afford
poor man in so difficult a journey as
that of his eternal blis or miserie.

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But when a man cometh to look into those transcendent writings, he finds them to be the works of a sort of innocent harmless men, that had little acquaintance or familiaritie with the world, and consequently not much interested in the troubles and quarrels of several Countries; That though they are all but necessarie, yet were they written occasionally, rather than out of design; and lastly, that their main business is, to abstract man from this world, and to perswade him to prefer the bare hope of what he can neither see, hear, nor conceive, before all the present enjoyments this world can afford. This begat a reverence and esteem to them in all those who endeavor to work out their salvation out of them. But if a man, not weighing them in themselves, shall consider the practices of those, who pretend to be the interpreters of them, & to make them fit meat for the people, how that is

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stead of renouncing the world, they endeavour to raise themselves into the greatest promotions, leisure, and luxury; that they make them the decoys of the people, to carry on designs and intrigues of State, and studie the enjoyments of this world more than any other people, he will find some grounds to conclude, the practices of such men to be the greatest disturbance, burden, and vexation of the Christian part of the world. The complaint is as true as sad; Instead of acquainting the credulous vulgar, with the main end of their functions, and the great business of their embassy, what a great measure of felicitie is prepared for them, and how easily it may be forfeited? they involve their consciences in the bryars of a thousand needless scruples, they spin out volumes out of half sentences, nay, out of points and accents, and raise endless Controversies about things (were men free from passion &

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prejudice) in themselves clear enough, and when they have canvas'd their questions, till they are wearie themselves, and have wearied hearers, and readers, and all they have to do with, every one sits down under his own vine, and hugs his own apprehensions, so that after all their pains, bandings, and implacable adhesion to parties, the inconvenience remains still, and we as far from any solid conviction, as at first setting out.

The Controversies betwixt Rome and the Reformation, are long since beaten out of the pit, by other combatants of their own brood, so that if we speak of Protestant and Catholick, they are in a manner content to sit down with their present acquiescence; for as to conviction he certainly is a rare Prosolite, at whose conversion, interest, humour, discontent, inclination, are not admitted to the debate.

But to come yet nearer our purpose,
Let

to the Reader.

Let us consider our own factions, of
factions of Religion here in England,
where if that saying, That, It is bet-
ter to live where nothing is lawfull,
than where all things, be as true in
Religion as Policie, Posteritie may
haply feel the sad consequence of it.
What I pray is the effect of so many
sermons, teachings, preachings, ex-
ercises, and exercising of gifts, meet-
ings, disputations, conferences, con-
venticles, Printed books, written
with so much distraction and presump-
tion upon God Almighty, and abuse
of his holy Word? Marry this, It is
the seminarie of a many vexations,
endless and fruitless controversies, the
consequence whereof, are jealousies,
heart-burnings, exasperation of par-
ties, the introduction of factions, and
National quarrels into matters of Re-
ligion, and consequently all the cala-
mities of war and devastation. Besides,
they are good lawfull diversions for

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the duller sort of Citizens, who contract diseases for want of motion; They supply the building of Pyramids among the Egyptians, by diverting the thoughts of the people from matters of State, and consequently from Rebellion.

They find work for Printers, &c. if the parties interess'd are troubled with the itch of popularitie, and will suffer themselves to be scratch'd out of somewhat by way of Contribution to the Impression. Hence are the Stationer's shop furnished, and thence the Minister's studie in the Countrey, who, having found out the humour of his auditorie, consults with his Stationer, on what Books his money is best bestowed, who very gravely, it may be, will commend Cole upon the Philippians before the excellent (but borrow'd) Caryll upon Job. But as to any matter of conviction, we see every one acquiesces in his own sentiments,
every

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every one hears the Teacher who is most to his humour, and when he hath been at Church, and pretends to have sat at his feet, comes home & censures him as he pleases.

To be yet a little more particular, what shall we think of those vast and involuble volumes concerning Predestination, Free-wil, Free-grace, Election, Reprobation, &c. which fill, not onely our Libraries, but the world with their noise and disturbance, whereof the least thing we are to expect is conviction; every side endeavouring to make good their own grounds, and keep the cudgels in their hands as long as they can? What Stir is there between the Molinists and Jansenists about Grace and Merits, and yet both pretend S. Augustin?

Must we not expect, that the Jesuits will, were it for no other end but to vindicate that reputation of Learning they have obtained in the world,

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endeavour to make good their Tenets, though the other were the truer opinion? Is Truth then retired to that inaccessible rock that admits no reproches? or are we all turn'd Ixion's, and instead of enjoying that Juno, entertain our selves with the clouds of our own persuasions, of which unnatural coition, what other issue can there be but Centaurs and monstrous opinions? To these questions I shall not presume to answer, but in the words of this great Author, who answering the charge of Impietie, laid upon the holding of Necessitie, says thus; If we consider the greatest part of Mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the studie of acquiring wealth and preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong Principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things, I must confess, &c.

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Certainly we have some reason to expect an effectual cure from this man, since he hath so fortunately found out the disease. Now if he in so few sheets hath performed more than all the voluminous works of the Priests & Ministers, and that in points of soul-concernment and Christian interest, as Predestination, Free-will, Grace, Merits, Election, Reprobation, Necessitie, and Libertie of actions, and others, the main hinges of human Salvation, and to do this, being a person, whom not onely the aversness of his nature to engage himself in matters of Controversie of this kind, but his severer studie of the Mathematicks, might justly exempt from any such skirmishes; We may not stick to infer, that the Black-Coats, generally taken, are a sort of ignorant Tinkers, who in matters of their own profession, such as is the mending and soldering of mens consciences, have made more holes

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holes than they found; nay, what makes them more impardonable, they have neither the gratitude nor ingenuitie to acknowledge this repairer of their breaches, and assertor of their reputation, who hath now effected what they all this while have been tampering about. I know this Author is little beholding to the Ministers, & they make a great part of the Nation, and besides them, I know there are a many illiterate, obstinate, and unconvincible spirits, yet I dare advance this proposition, how bold soever it may seem to some; That this Book, how little and contemptible soever it may seem, contains more evidence and conviction in the matters it treats of, than all the volumes, nay Libraries, which the Priests, Jesuits, and Ministers have, to our great charge, distraction, and loss of precious time, furnished us with. Which if so, I shall undertake for any rational man, That all the controver-

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sial Labors concerning Religion in the world; all the Polemical Treatises of the most antient or modern, shall never breed any maggots of scruples; or dissatisfactions in his brains, nor shall his eyes or head ever ache with turning them over, but he shall be so resolved in mind, as never to importune God Almighty with impertinent addressees, nor ever become any of those Enthusiastical Spiritati, who as the most Learned M. White says, expound Scripture without sence or reason, (and are not to be disputed with, but with the same success, as men write on sand) and trouble their neighbours with their dreams, revelations, and spiritual whimsies. No; here is solid conviction, at least, so far as the Metaphysical Mysteries of our Religion will admit. If God be omnipotent, he is irresistible; if so, just in all his actions, though we (who have as much capacitie to measure the justice of Gods

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Gods actions as a man born blind to judge of colours) haply may not discern it. What then need any man trouble his head whether he be Predestinated or no? Let him live justly and honestly according to the Religion of his Countrey, and refer himself to God for the rest, since he is the Potter, and may do what he please with the vessel. But I leave the Reader to finde his satisfaction in the Treatise it self, since it may be I derogate from it by saying so much before it. This Book, I doubt not will find no worse entertainment than the Leviathan, both in regard of its bulk, and that it doth not strike so home at the Ministers and Catholick partie as that did. And yet here we must complain of want of sufficiency or ingenuitie, to acknowledge the truths, or confute the errors of that book, which till it is done, we shall not count the Author an Heretick. On this side the sea, besides the dirt and slander

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der cast on him in Sermons & private meetings, none hath put any thing in Print against him, but Mr. Rosse, one who may be said to have had so much Learning as to have been perpetually barking at the works of the most learned. How he hath been received beyond Seas I know not, but certainly, not without the regret of the Catholics, who building their Church on other foundations than those of the Scriptures, and pretending infallibillie, certitude, and unitie in Religion, cannot but be discontented that these Prerogatives of Religion are taken away, not onely from Tradition, that is to say, from the Church, but also from the Scriptures, and are invested in the Supream power of the Nation, be it of what perswasion it will.

Thus much, Reader, I have thought fit to acquaint thee with, that thou mightest know what a jewel thou hast in thy hands, which thou must accordingly

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ingly value, not by the bulk, but the preciousness. Thou hast here in a few sheets what might prove work enough for many thousand sermons and exercises; and more than the Catéchisms and Confessions of a thousand Assemblies could furnish thee with; Thou hast what will cast an eternal blemish on all the corner'd caps of the Priests and Jesuits, and all the black & white caps of the Ministers; to be short, Thou art now acquainted with that Man, who, in matters of so great importance as those of thy salvation, furnishes thee with better instructions, than any thou hast ever yet been acquainted with, what profession, perswasion, opinion, or Church soever thou art of; of whom and his works make the best use thou canst, &c. Farewell.

RIGHT HONOURABLE



Had once resolved to answer my Lord Bishops Objections to my Book *De CIVI* in the first place as that which concerns me most, and afterwards to examine his discourse of *LIBERTY* and *NECESSITY*, which (because I had never uttered my opinion ~~of~~ it) concerned me the less. But seeing it was your Lordships and my Lord Bishops desire that I should begin with the *latter*, I was contented so to do, and here I present and submit it to your Lordships judgement.

And first I assure your Lordship

I finde in it no new argument neither from *Scripture* nor from *Reason*, that I have not often heard before, which is as much as to say, I am not surprized.

The *preface* is a handsome one, but it appeareth even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he sayes thus, *If I be free to write this discourse, I have obtained the Cause*, I deny that to be true, for 'tis enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should ~~write~~^{writ} it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one to say; *I was free to write it, and It was not necessary I should write it*, but I think otherwise; for he is free to do a thing that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear, if he have the will to forbear.

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And yet if there be a *necessity* that he shall have the *will* to do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if there be a *necessity* that he shall have the *will* to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The Question therefore is not whether a *man* be a *free Agent*, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent according to his *will*, but whether the *will* to write and the *will* to forbear come upon him according to his *will*, or according to any thing else in his own power. I acknowledge this *Liberty* that I *can* do if I *will*, but to say, I *can will* if I *wille*. I take to be an absurd speech, wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his *preface*.

In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of *Libertie*, and saies he meaneth not *Libertie* from *sin*, nor from *servitude*, nor from *violence*,

violence, but from *Necessitie* *Necessitation*, *inevitabilitie*, and *determination* to one.

It had been better to *define Liberty* than thus to *distinguish*, for I understand never the more what he means by *Libertie*, and though he say he means *Libertie* from *necessitation*, yet I understand not how such a *Libertie* can be, and tis a taking of the Question without proof, for what is else the Question between us, but whether *such* a Liberty be possible or not?

There are in the same place other distinctions, as a Liberty of *Exercise onely* (which he calls a *Libertie of contradiction*, namely of doing not good or evil *simply*, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil *respectively*) and a *Libertie of specification and exercise also* (which he calls a Liberty of *contrarietie*) namely a Liberty not onely to do
good

good or evil , but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.

And with these *Distinctions* his Lordship saies he *clears the coast*, whereas in truth , he darkneth his own meaning and the Question, not onely with the jargon of *exercise onely* , *specification also* , *contradiction* , *contrarietie* , but also with pretending distinction where none is ; For how is it possible that the *Libertie* of doing or not doing this or that good or evil , can consist (as he saies it does in God and good Angels) without a Liberty of doing or not doing good or evil ?

The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast , is the dividing of his forces (as he calls them) into *two squadrons* , *one* of places of *Scriptures* , the *other* of *Reasons* , which allegory he useth I suppose , because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship , who is

military man , All that I have to say touching this is , that I observe a great part of those his *forces* do look and *march* another way , and some of them *fight* amongst themselves.

And the first place of *Scripture* taken from *Numb.* 30. 24. Is one of those that look another way ; the words are. *If a wife make a vow it is left to her husbands choice either to establish it or make it void.* For it proves no more but that the husband is a *free and voluntary Agent* , but not that his *choice* therein is not *necessitated* or not *determined* to what he shall choose , by precedent *necessary* causes.

For if there come into the husbands minde greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow , the establishing will follow necessarily , and if the evil that will follow in the husbands opinion outweigh the good , the contrary must needs

needs follow, and yet in this following of ones *hopes* and *fears* consisteth the nature of *Election*. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this, and consequently *choosing* and *necessity* are joyned together.

The second place of Scripture is *Ioshua* 24. 15. The third is *2 Sam.* 24. 12. whereby 'tis clearly proved, that there is *election* in *man*, but not proved, that such *election* was not *necessitated* by the *hopes*, and *fears*, and considerations of *good* and *bad* to follow, which depend not on the *will*, nor are subject to *election*. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if there were a thousand.

But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have done, that *necessity* and *election* might stand together, and instance in the actions of *children*, *fools*, or *bruit beasts*, whose *fancies*, I might say, are
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necessitated and determined to one, before these his proofs out of *Scripture* desires to prevent that instance, and therefore saies that the actions of *children, fools, mad men, and beasts*, are indeed determined, but that they proceed not from *election*, nor from *free*, but from *Spontaneous Agents*. As for example that the *Bee*, when it maketh hony, does it *Spontaneously*, and when the *Spider* makes his web, he does it *Spontaneously* but not by *election*.

Though I never meant to ground my Answer upon the experience of what *Children, Fools, Mad men, and Beasts* do, yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by *Spontaneous*, and how it differeth from *voluntary*, I will answer that *distinction*, and shew that it *fighteth* against its fellow Arguments.

Your Lordship therefore is to
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consider, that all *voluntary* actions, where the thing that induceth the will is not *fear*, are called also *spontaneous*, and said to be done by a mans *own* accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for Merchandise or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in *latine* is *sponte*, and therefore the action is *spontaneous* (though to give ones money willingly to a thief to a void killing, or throw it into the Sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is *fear*, be not called *spontaneous*.) But every *spontaneous* action is not therefore *voluntary*, for *voluntary* presupposes some precedent *deliberation*, that is to say, some *consideration* and *meditation*, of what is likely to *follow*, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our *own* accord,

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and are therefore *spontaneous*, for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never *consulted* nor *deliberated* in our selves. As when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world, but the thing we are about is good, we *eat* and *walk*, or in anger *strike* or *revile*, which my Lord thinks *spontaneous*, but not *voluntary* nor *elective* actions, and with such kinde of actions he saies *necessitation* may stand, but not with such as are *voluntary* and proceed upon *election* and *deliberation*. Now if I make it appear to your Lordship, that those actions, which he saies, proceed from *spontaneity*, and which he ascribes to *Children*, *Fools*, *Madmen* and *Beasts*, proceed from *election* and *deliberation*, and that actions *inconsiderate*, *rash*, and *spontaneous* are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more
 though

thought as *wise*, or wiser than ordinarily men are, then my Lord Bishops Argument concludeth, that *necessity* and *election* may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his Arguments to prove.

And first your Lordships own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that *Horses*, *Dogs*, and other Bruit *Beasts*, do *demur* oftentimes upon the way they are to take, the Horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth a man that *deliberateth*, but one while *proceed* toward action, another while *retire* from it, as the *hope* of greater good draws him, or the *fear* of greater evil drives him away.

A *Child* may be so young as to do what it does without all *deliberation*, but that is but till it have the

chance to be hurt by doing of something, or till it be of age to understand the rod, for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be *deliberated* on the second time.

Fools and *Madmen* manifestly *deliberate* no less than the *wisest* men, though they make not so good a *choice*, the images of things being by disease altered.

For *Bees* and *Spiders*, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a spectatour of their actions, he would have confessed not onely *election* but *art*, *prudence* and *policy* in them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of *Bees*, *Aristotle* saies, *their life is Civil*.

Again, his Lorpship is deceived if he think any *spontaneous* action after once being checked in it, differs from an action *voluntary* and *elective*, for even the setting of a mans foot, in the posture for walking

ing, and the action of ordinary eating was once *deliberated* of how and when it should be done, and though afterward it became *ease* & *habitual* so as to be done without *fore-thought*, yet that does not hinder but that the act is *voluntary* and proceedeth from *election*. So also are the *rashest* actions of *choleric* persons *voluntary* and upon *deliberation*, for who is there but very young children, that hath not *considered* when and how farr he ought, or safely may strike or revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me that such actions are *necessitated*, and the *fancie* of those that do them *determined* to the action they do, it follows, out of his Lordships own doctrine, that the liberty of *election* does not take away the *necessitie* of *electing* this or that *individual* thing. And thus one of his Arguments fights against another.

The 2 Argument from *Scripture* consisteth in histories of men that did onething, when if they would, they might have done another, the places are two. One is 1 *Kings* 3. 11. where the history saies, God was pleased that *Solomon*, who might if he would, have asked *Riches*, or *Revenge*, did nevertheless aske *wisdom* at Gods hands; the other is the words of *S. Peter* to *Ananias*, *Acts* 5. 4. *After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?*

To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places, that they prove there is *election*, but do not disprove the *necessity*, which I maintain of what they so elect.

The fourth Argument (for to the 3 and fifth I shall make but one answer) is to this effect. *If the decree of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral*

moral efficacy of causes, or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. *Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi.*

That which I say necessitateth and determinateth every action, (that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning) is the sum of all things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concurrence of causes, whereof every one is determined be such as it is by a like concurrence of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the Decree of God.

But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing,

cannot be truly said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known and not they on it.

The influence of the Starres is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concurrence of all Agents.

Nor does the *concurrence of all causes* make one simple chain or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains, joyned together, not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty, and consequently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on one single chain, but on many together.

Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary Agents and necessitates the will, and consequently the action; but for *moral efficacy*, I understand not what he means.

The last dictate of the judgement,
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concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action, is not properly the *whole cause*, but the last part of it, and yet may be said to Produce the effect *necessarily*, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horses back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it.

Now for his *Argument* that if the *concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect*, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty, I deny the consequence, for I make not onely the effect, but also the *election* of that particular effect *necessary*, in as much as the will it self, & each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn than that a man or other creature,

whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have *election*, that is *liberty*, to do what he hath a fancy to do, though it be not in his *will* or *power* to *choose* his *fancie*, or choose his *election* and *will*.

This doctrine, because my Lord Bishop saies he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.

The Arguments of greatest consequence, are the third and the fifth, and they fall both into one, namely; *If there be a necessity of all events, that it will follow, That praise and reprehension, and reward and punishment are all vain and unjust, and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of Heaven and Hell.*

To

To oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from *S. Paul*, *Rom. 9. 11.* From the 11 verse of the Chapter to the 18 is laid down the very same objection in these words. *When they* (meaning *Esau* and *Jacob*) *were yet unburn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto her* (.viz. *Rebecca*) *that the elder should serve the younger, &c.* What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth; but in God that sheweth mercy. For the Scripture saith to *Pharaoh*, *I have stirred thee up that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be set forth in all the earth. Therefore whom God willeth he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth.* Thus you
see

See the case put by *S. Paul*, is the same with that of my Lord Bishop, and the same objection in these words following.

Thou wilt aske me then, why does God yet complain, for who hath resisted his will?

To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by decaying it was Gods will, or that the decree of God concerning *Eſau* was not before he had sinned, or that *Eſau* was not necessitated to do what he did; but thus; *Who art thou O man that interrogateſt God? Shall the work ſay to the workman, why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the ſame ſtuff to make one veſſel to honour another to diſhonour? According therefore to this answer of S. Paul I answer my Lords Ojection, and ſay, the power of God alone without other helps is ſufficient juſtification of any action he doth.*

doth. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are accounted and tearmed rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God Almightyes actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by humane wisdom. That which he does is made just by his doing it, just I say in him, though not always just in us.

For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the same, if he punish him that he so commandeth for not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted *Job*, he did object no sin unto him, justified his afflicting of him by telling him of his power. *Hast thou*

thou, saith God, an arm like mine?
 Where wert thou when I laid the
 foundations of the earth? and the like.
 So our Saviour, concerning the
 man that was born blinde, said it
 was not for his sin, or for his Pa-
 rents sin, but that the power of God
 might be shewn in him. *Beasts* are
 subject to death and torments, yet
 they cannot sin, it was Gods will
 they should be so. *Power irresistible*
justifies all actions, really and proper-
ly, in whomsoever it be found, less
power does not, and because such
power is in God onely, he must
needs be just in all his actions, and
we, that not comprehending his
Counsels call him to the Barr, com-
mit injustice in it.

I am not ignorant of the usual
 reply to this answer, by distinguish-
 ing between *will* and *permission*, as
 that God Almighty does indeed
 sometimes *permit* sins, and that he
 also

also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed, but does not *will* it, nor *necessitate* it.

I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, that God Almighty does indeed cause the *action* whatsoever action it be, but not the *sinfulness* or *irregularity* of it, that is, the *discordance* between the *action* and the *Law*. Such distinctions as these dazle my understanding; I finde no difference between the *will* to have a thing done, and the *permission* to do it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor finde I any difference between an *action* & the *sin* of that action, as for example, between the killing of *Uriah*, and the sin of *David* in killing *Uriah*, nor when one is *cause* both of the *Action* and of the *Law*, how *another* can, because of

of the *disagreement* between them, no more than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know, God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just and consequently, no sin, as also because whatsoever can sin is subject to anothers Law, which God is not. And therefore 'tis blasphemy to say God can sin; but to say, that God can so order the world, as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other *distinctions* can make it clear, that S. Paul did not think *Esans* or *Pharaohs* actions proceeded from the *will* and *purpose* of God, or that proceeding from his will, could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn

turn unto my Lords Opinion, for I now hold nothing in all this question betwixt us, but what seemeth to me, not obscurely, but most expressly said in this place by *S. Paul*. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.

To the Arguments from Reason.

OF the Arguments from *Reason*, the first is that which his Lordship saith is drawn from *Zeno's* beating of his man, which is therefore called *Argumentum baculinum*, that is to say, a wooden Argument. The story is this, *Zeno* held, that all actions were necessary, his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it, to avoid this excuse, his Master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him.

him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would inferr. And the Argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.

The second Argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use might be made of it, and therefore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop, ought at my request to keep private what I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth, and now the question is not, what is fit to be preached, but what is true.

The first inconvenience he saies is this. *That the Laws, which prohibit any action, will be unjust.*

2. *That all consultations are vain.*

3. *That admonitions to men of under-*

understanding, are of no more use, than
to children, fools, and mad men.

4. That praise, dispraise, reward
and punishment are in vain.

5. 6. That Counsels, Acts, Arms,
Books, Instruments, Study, Tutors,
Medicines, are in vain.

To which arguments his Lord-
ship expecting I should answer, by
saying, the ignorance of the event
were enough to make us use the
means, adds (as it were a reply to
my answer foreseen) these words.
*Alas! how should our not knowing
the event be a sufficient motive to make
us use the means? Wherein his Lord-
ship saies right, but my answer is not
that which he expecteth, I answer.*

First, that the necessity of an acti-
on doth not make the *Laws* that
prohibit it *unjust*. To let pass that
not the necessity, but the will to break
the *Law*, maketh the action *unjust*,
because the *Law* regardeth the will
and

and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no *Law* can possibly be *unjust*, in as much as every man maketh (by his consent) the *Law* he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself. I say what *necessary* cause soever precede an *action*, yet if the action be *forbidden*, he that doth it *willingly* may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the *Law* on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man, who by the strength of temptation is *necessitated* to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from Theft? is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their wills to justice?

To make the *Law*, is therefore to make a *Cause* of *Justice*, and to *necessitate* Justice, and consequently

tis no injustice to make such a Law.
 on The intention of the *Law* is not
 to grieve the *Delinquent* for that
 which is past, and not to be undone,
 but to make him and others *just*, that
 else would not be so, and respecteth
 not the evil act *past*, but the *good*
to come, in so much as without the
 good intention for the future, no
 past act of a *Delinquent* could justi-
 fie his killing in the sight of God.
 But you will say how is it just to
 kill one man to amend another, if
 what were done were *necessary*?
 To this I answer, that men are justly
 killed, not for that their *actions* are
 not *necessitated*, but because they
 are *noxious*, and they are spared and
 preserved whose actions are not
 noxious. For where there is no Law,
 there no killing nor any thing else
 can be unjust, and by the right of
 nature, we destroy (without being
 unjust) all that is noxious both
 Beasts

Beasts and Men, and for Beasts we kill them justly when we do it in order to our own preservation, and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions, as being onely *spontaneous*, and not *free*, are all *necessitated* and determined to that one thing they shall do. For men, when we make Societies or Common-Wealths we lay not down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murther, theft or other offensive action; so that the right, which the *Common-Wealth* hath to put a man to death for crimes is not created by the *Law*, but remains from the first right of *nature*, which every man hath to preserve himself, for that the Law doth not take the right away in the case of Criminals, who were by the Law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or punished for that their theft proceedeth from *election*, but because it was

noxious

maxims and contrary to mens preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest, in as much as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh mens *wills* such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the necessity of a *voluntary* action, cannot be inferred the *injustice* of the *Law* that forbiddeth it, or the Magistrate that punisheth it.

Secondly, I deny that it maketh *consultations* to be in *vain*, 'tis the *consultation* that *causeth* a man, & *necessitateth* him to *choose* to do one thing rather than another, so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which *necessitateth* the effect, he cannot infer the superfluoussness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordships reasons thus, If I must do this rather than that,

that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all, which is a false proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this, if I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run my self through with a sword to day. If there be a *necessity* that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass, and therefore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another, 'tis determined also for what *cause* it shall so be chosen, which cause, for the most part, is *deliberation* or *consultation*, and therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated, if *more* and *less* had any place in *necessity*.

The same answer is to be given
to

to the third supposed inconvenience, namely that *admonitions* are in *vain*; for the Admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a Councillour for the time to him that is admonished.

○ The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that *praise*, *dispraise*, *reward* and *punishment* will be in *vain*. To which I answer, that for *praise* and *dispraise*, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to *praise*, but to say a thing is good? good I say for me, or for some body else, or for the State and Commonwealth? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? Or as another would have it, or according to the will of the State? that is to say, according to the Law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me, or him, or the Commonwealth that

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should

should proceed from *necessity*? things may be therefore *necessary*, and yet *praise-worthy*, as also *necessary*, and yet *dispraised*, and neither of them both in vain, because *praise* and *dispraise*, and likewise *Reward* and *Punishment*, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that *Velleius Paterculus* gives *Cato*, where he saies that he was good by *nature*, *Et quia aliter esse non potuit.*

To the fifth and sixth inconveniences, that *Counsels*, *Arts*, *Arms*, *Instruments*, *Books*, *Study*, *Medicines* and the like would be *superfluous*, the same answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this consequence, *If the effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its causes* is a false one, and those things named *Counsels*, *Arts*, *Arms*, &c. are the causes of these effects.

His

His Lordships *third* Argument consisteth in other *inconveniences*, which he saith will follow, namely *Impiety* and *negligence* of religious duties, as *Repentance*, and *Zeal* to Gods service, &c.

To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of Mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles have made unapt to discuss the truth of things, I must I say confess, that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety, and therefore if his Lordship had not desired this answer, I should not have written it, nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it

private. Nevertheless in very truth, the *necessity* of events does not of it self draw with it any *impiety* at all. For *piety* consisteth onely in *two* things; one that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his *power* as we can, (for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power.) The other is, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called, *Cultus*, or *worship of God*. He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from Gods *eternal will*, and consequently are *necessary*, does he not think God *Omnipotent*? Does he not esteem of his *power* as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by *external* acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is this

this external acknowledgement the same thing which we call *worship*. So that this opinion fortifies *piety* in both kinds, external and internal, therefore is far from destroying it. And for *Repentance*, which is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way; though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remained still the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of *Repentance*, grief for the error, and joy for returning.

And for *prayer*, whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroy *prayer*, I deny it, for though *prayer* be none of the causes that move Gods will (his will being unchangeable.

geable) yet since we finde in Gods word, he will not give his blessings but to those that aske, the motive of prayer is the same. *Prayer* is the gift of God no less than the *blessing*, and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. 'Tis manifest that *Thanksgiving* is no cause of the blessing past, and that which is past is sure and necessary, yet even amongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgement of the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for Gods blessings in general, and though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner, as he, not as we, will, and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray *thy will*,
not

not our will, *be done*, and by example teaches us the same, for he prayed thus, *Father if it be thy will let this cup pass*, &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to *move* but to *honour* God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him onely.

The fourth Argument from Reason is this, The order, beauty and perfection of the world requireth that in the universe should be Agents of all sorts; some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make all things necessary, . . . all things free, or all things contingent doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world.

In which Argument I observe first a *Contradiction*, for seeing he that *maketh* any thing in that he maketh it, maketh it to be *necessary*, it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessarily to be; As if a work-man make a gar-

ment the garment must necessarily be, so if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth (though we know it not) that some Agents should work without deliberation (which his Lordship calls *necessary* Agents) and some Agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call *free* Agents) and that some Agents should work, and we not know how (and their effects we both call *Contingents*) but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his *election* necessarily determined to *one* by *former* causes, and that which is *contingent* and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless *necessary* and depend on *precedent* necessary causes. For by *contingent*, men do not mean that which hath *no* cause, but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive; As for example,
when

when a Traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it, but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were contingent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events, *necessary, contingent, and free*, yet they may be *all necessary* without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.

To the first Argument from Reason, which is, *that if liberty be taken away, the nature and formel reason of sin is taken away*, I answer by denying the consequence; The nature of sin consisteth in this, that the *action* done proceed from our will and be against the *Law*. A Judge in judging whether it be sin or no which is done against the Law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the will of the doer.

Now when I say the action was *necessary*, I do not say it was done *against* the will of the doer, but *with* his will, and *necessarily*, because mans will, that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a *sufficient*, and therefore a *necessary* cause, and consequently every *voluntary* action was *necessitated*. An action therefore may be *voluntary* and a *sin*, and nevertheless be *necessary*, and, because God may afflict by a right derived from his *Omnipotence*, though sin were not, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for God to punish such sinners (as I have said before) is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his Lordships Objections both out of Scripture and from Reason.

Certain Distinctions which his
*Lordship supposing might
 be brought to evade his
 Arguments are by him
 removed.*

HE saies a man may perhaps an-
 swer, that the *necessity* of things
 held by him, is not a *Stoicall* necessi-
 ty, but a *Christian* necessity, &c. But
 this *distinction* I have not used, nor
 indeed ever heard before, nor could
 I think any man could make *Stoicall*
 and *Christian* two kindes of *necessi-*
ty, though they may be two kindes
 of *Doctrin*e. Nor have I drawn my
 Answer to his Lordships Arguments
 from the authority of any *sect*, but
 from the nature of the things them-
 selves.

But here I must take notice of
 certain words of his Lordships in
 this place, as making against his own
*Tenet. Where all the causes, saith he
 being*

being joyned together and subordinate one to another do make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of causes, be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary. For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, is the joyning together of all causes subordinate to the first into one total cause. If any of these saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined. Now it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his Lordships own reason all effects are necessary.

Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the *first cause*, and necessary in respect of *Second causes* mine, it does (as his Lordship well notes) imply a contradiction.

diction. But the distinction of *free* into *free from compulsion* and *free from Necessitation*, I acknowledge, for to be *free from compulsion* is to do a thing so as *terror* be not the cause of his *will* to do it; for a man is then onely said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it. As when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do any thing for *love*, or *revenge*, or *lust* are *free from compulsion*, and yet their actions may be as necessarie as those that are done by compulsion; for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear. But *free from Necessitation*. I say, no man can be, and 'tis that which his Lordship undertook to disprove.

This distinction, his Lordship says, uses to be fortified by two reasons (but they are not mine.) The first he

he says, is, that it is granted by all Divines, that an *Hypothetical necessitie*, or *Necessitie* upon supposition, may stand with *Libertie*. That you may understand this, I will give you an example of *Hypothetical necessity*. If I shall live, I shall eat. This is an *Hypothetical necessitie*. Indeed it is a necessarie proposition, that is to say, it is necessarie that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered, but 'tis not the necessitie of the thing, nor is it therefore necessarie that the man should live, nor that the man should eat. I do not use to fortifie my distinctions with such reasons, let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me; but I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how easie and plain a thing, (but withal false) with the grave usage of such terms as *Hypothetical necessitie*, and *Necessitie upon supposition*, and such like terms

of

of School-men may be obscured and made to seem *profound learning*:

The second reason that may confirm the distinction of *free from compulsion*, and *free from necessitation*, he says is, that God and good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so farforth good, as it is true that God and good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are free; but because I find not in the Articles of our Faith, nor in the decrees of our Church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good Angels to work by necessitie, or in what sence they work *Freely*, I suspend my sentence in that point, and am content that there be a *freedom from Compulsion*, and yet no *freedom from Necessitation*, as hath been proved, in that a man may be necessitated to some action without threats
and

and without fear of danger. But how my Lord can avoid the consisting together of *freedom* and *necessitie*, supposing God and good Angels are freer than men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must examine. I confess, saith he, *that God & good Angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in degree of Freedom, not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a libertie of exercise, not of specification.*

Again, we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom, to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the Reader: For it cannot be conceived that there is any libertie greater, than for a man to do what he will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but not one libertie than another; he that can do what he will, hath all libertie possible,

ble, and he that cannot hath none at all. Also *Libertie* (as his Lordship says the Schools call it) of *exercise*, which is as I have said before, a libertie to do or not to do, cannot be without a *Libertie* (which they call) of *Specification*, that is to say, a libertie to do, or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man conceive he hath libertie to do any thing, that hath not libertie to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a libertie to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by this again see the vanitie of distinctions used in the *Schools*, and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them, by Authoritie of *Doctors* in the *Church*, hath been a great cause that men have labored, though

though by Sedition and evil courses, to shake them off, for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over mens reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the pretence of Learning, and more judgement than that of other men.

In the next place his Lordship bringerh two Arguments against distinguishing between *free from compulsion* and *free from necessitation*.

The first is, that *election* is opposite not onely to *Coaction* or *compulsion*, but also *Necessitation* or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new Argument to prove it, and so those brought formerly I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to either, For, when a man is compelled for example to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still

will election left him, and a delibe-
 ration to bethink which of the two
 he can better endure. And he that
 is led to prison by force hath election
 and may deliberate whether he will
 be hal'd and traird on the ground,
 or make use of his own feet: Like-
 wise when there is no *compulsion*,
 but the strength of *temptation* to do
 an evil action, being greater than
 the motives to *abstain*, it necessari-
 ly determines him to the doing of it,
 yet he deliberates while sometimes
 the motives to do, sometimes the
 motives to forbear are working on
 him, and consequently he *electeth*
 which he will. But commonly when
 we see and know the strength that
 moves us, we acknowledge *necessity*;
 but when we see not or mark not
 the force that moves us, we then
 think there is none, and that it is
 not *causes* but *liberty* that produceth
 the *action*. Hence it is that they think
 he does not choose this that of ne-
 cessity

cessity choose it, but they might as well say, fire doth not burn because it burns of necessity.

The second Argument is not so much an argument as a distinction, to shew in what sence it may be said that *voluntary* actions are *necessitated* and in what sence not. And therefore his Lordship alledgeth as from the authority of the *Schools* (and that which rippeth up the bottom of the *Question*) that there is a double act of the *will*. The one he says is *Actus imperatus*, an act done at the command of the will, by some inferiour faculty of the soul; As to open or shut ones eyes, and this act may be compell'd, the other he saies, is *Actus elicited*, an act allured or drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to *will*, to *choose*, to *elect*, this he saies cannot be compelled. Wherein (letting pass that metaphorical speech
of

of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a Common-Wealth or family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of a question) you may observe, first, that to compel a *voluntary* act, is nothing else but to will it, for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of my eyes, or the doing of any other action, and to say, I have the will to shut my eyes; so that *Actus imperatus*, here, might as easily have been said in English a *voluntry action*, but that they that invented the term understood not any thing it signified.

Secondly, you may observe, that *Actus elicitedus*, is exemplified by these words, to *will*, to *elect*, to *choose*, which are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed

indeed as the will is a faculty or power in a mans soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance, so is it also to say, so that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his Lordships distinction, is, that a *voluntary* act may be done by *compulsion*, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that or any act cannot be but by *allurement*, or fair means. Now seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements produce the action which they do produce, as *necessarily* as foul means and threatening, it follows, that to *will* may be made as *necessarie* as any thing that is done by *compulsion*. So that the distinction of *Actus imperatus*, and *Actus*

Actus eliciti are but words, and of no effect against necessitie.

His Lordship in the rest of his discourse, reckoneth up the opinion of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessitie of things (which they maintain) consisteth. And first he saith, the *Astrologer* deriveth his *necessitie* from the *stars*; Secondly, that the *Physitian* attributeth it to the *temper* of the bodie. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because, neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the Patient alone is able to produce any effect, without the concurrence of all other Agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in *rerum natura*, which because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, *external objects* presented to men of such and such temperatures, do make their actions *necessarie*, and says, the power such objects have over us, proceeds from our own fault, but that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power, and therefore that opinion may hold true for all that answer.

Further he says, *Prayer, Fasting, &c.* may alter our *habits*; 'tis true, but when they do so, they are *causes* of the contrarie *habit*, and make it *necessarie*, as the former habit had been *necessarie* if *Prayer, Fasting, &c.* had not been. Besides, we are not moved or disposed to prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, of something equivolent. Fourthly, he says a resolved mind is
not

not easily surpris'd , as the mind of *Ulysses*, who when others wept , alone wept not, and of the *Philosopher*, that abstained from striking, because he found himself angrie; and of him that poured out the water when he was thirstie , and the like. Such things I confess have , or may have been done, and do prove onely that it was not necessarie for *Ulysses* then to weep , nor for that *Philosopher* to strike , nor for that other man to drink, but it does not prove that it was not necessarie for *Ulysses* then to abstain (as he did) from weeping, nor for the *Philosopher* to abstain (as he did) from striking, nor for the other man to forbear drinking, and yet that was the thing his Lordship ought to have proved. Lastly, his Lordship confesses , that the *dispositions* of objects may be dangerous to libertie, but cannot be destructive. To which I answer , it

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is

- is impossible; for *libertie* is never in any other danger than to be lost, and if it cannot be lost (which he confesses) I may infer it can be in no danger at all.

The fourth opinion his Lordship rejecteth , is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding ; but it seems his Lordship understands that Tenet in another sence than I do ; for he speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain, which is a thing his Lordship (with reason) thinks untrue. But I understand it to signifie , that the *will* follows the *last* opinion or *judgement* immediately proceding the *action*, concerning whether it be good to do it or not , whether he have weighed it long before, or not at all , and that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for example, when

a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroak, immediately before the lifting up of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sence, the *last* dictate of the understanding does *necessitate* the *action*, though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause, as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horses back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needed but the addition of one to make the weight sufficient.

That which his Lordship alleadgeth against this, is, First out of a *Poet*, who in the person of *Medea* says, — *Video meliora, proboq;*

Deteriora sequor.

but that saying (as prettie as it is) is not true: for though *Medea* saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgement was, that the present revenge on her husband out-weighed them all, and thereupon the wicked

action necessarily followed. Then the story of the *Roman*, who of two competitors, said, one had the better reason, but the other must have the office. This also maketh against his Lordship, for the last dictate of his judgement that had the bestowing of the office, was this, That it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit.

Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the sense move more powerfully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action than the foresight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his Lordship saies that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his Son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding, but it argues plainly that sorrow for sin is not *voluntary*, and by consequence, that

that *Repentance* proceedeth from *Causes*.

The last part of this discourse containeth his Lordships opinion about reconciling *liberty* with the *prescience* and *decree* of *God*, otherwise than some *Divines* have done, against whom, he saies, he had formerly written a *Treatise*, out of which he repeateth onely two things. One is, *that we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it.* And I say the same, as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain truth, *That there are certain and necessary causes which make every man to will what he willeth, though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused.* And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that *praise, dispraise, reward and punishment, good and evil sequels of mens*

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actions

actions retained in *memory*, do frame and make us to the *election* of whatsoever it be that we elect, and that the *memory* of such things proceeds from the *sences*, and *sence* from the operation of the *objects* of *sence* (which are external to us and governed onely by God Almighty) and by consequence all *actions*, even of *free* and *voluntary* Agents are *necessary*.

The other thing that he repeateth is, that the best way to reconcile *contingence* and *liberty* with *Prescience* and the *decrees* of God, is to subject future *contingencies* to the *Aspect* of God. Thesame is also my opinion, but contrary to what his Lordship all this while laboured to prove. For hitherto he held *liberty* and *necessity*, that is to say, *liberty* and the *decrees* of God irreconcilable, unless the *Aspect* of God (which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signifie somewhat else besides Gods
will

will and decree, which I cannot understand. But he adds that we must subject them, according to that *presentiality* which they have in *eternity*, which he saies cannot be done by them that conceive *Eternity* to be an *everlasting succession*, but onely by them, that conceive it as an *Indivisible point*. To which I answer, that assoon as I can conceive *Eternity* to be an *Indivisible point*, or any thing, but an *everlasting succession*, I will renounce all, that I have written on this subject. I know *S. Thomas Aquinas* calls *Eternity*, *Nunc stans*, an *ever-abiding now*, which is easie enough to say, but though I fain would, yet I could never conceive it, they that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth all men to be of my opinion save onely those that can conceive in their minds a *nunc stans*, which I think are none. I understand as lit-

tie how it can be true his Lordship
 saies, that *God* is not *just* but *justice*
it self, not *wise*, but *wisdom it self*,
 not *Eternal*, but *Eternity it self*, nor
 how he concludes thence that *Eter-*
nity is a *point indivisible*, and not
 a *succession*, nor in what sence it
 can be said, that an *infinite point*, and
 wherein is no *succession*, can com-
 prehend all *time*, though time be
successive. These phrases I finde not
 in the *Scripture*, I wonder there-
 fore what was the design of the
School-men to bring them up, un-
 less they thought a man could not
 be a true *Christian* unless his un-
 derstanding be first strangled with
 such hard sayings. And thus much
 for answer to his Lordships dis-
 course, wherein I think not onely
 his *Squadrons of Arguments*, but
 also his *Reserve of Distinctions* are
 defeated. And now your Lordship
 shall have my doctrine concerning
 the same question, with my *Rea-*
sons

sons for it , positively , and as briefly
as I can , without any terms of *Art*
in plain *English*.

My Opinion about LIBERTIE and NECESSITIE.

First I conceive, that when
it cometh into a mans
mind to do or not to do
some certain action, if he have
no time to *deliberate* , the do-
ing it or abstaining *necessarily*
follow the *present* thought he
hath of the *good* or *evil* conse-
quence thereof to himself. As
for example, In sudden *anger*,
the *action* shall follow the
thought of *revenge*, in sudden
fear the thought of *escape*. Al-

so when a man hath time to *deliberate*, but deliberates not, because never any thing appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the *action* follows his opinion of the *goodness* or *harm* of it. These actions I call VOLUNTARY, (my Lord) if I understand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them *voluntarie*, because those *actions* that follow immediately the *last* appetite are *voluntarie*, and here where is one onely appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see 'tis reasonable to punish a *rash* ACTION, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were *voluntarie*. For no *action* of a man can be said to be

be without *deliberation*, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to *deliberate* all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of *Anger*, shall nevertheless be justly put to *death*, because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual *deliberation*, and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed frō *election*.

Secondly, I conceive when a man *deliberates*, whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do

do

do it. And to *consider* an action, is to imagine the *consequences* of it both *good* and *evil*. From whence is to be inferred, that *Deliberation* is nothing else but *alternate* imagination of the *good* and *evil* sequels of an *action*, or (which is the same thing) *alternate hope* and *fear*, or *alternate appetite* to do or quit the action of which he *deliberateth*.

Thirdly, I conceive that in all *deliberations*, that is to say, in at *alternate succession* of contrary *appetites*, the last is that which we call the *WILL*, & is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other *Appetites* to do, and to quit,
that

that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called *Intentions*, & *Inclination*, but not *Wills*, there being but *one* will, which also in this case may be called the *last* will, though the *Intentions* change often.

Fourthly, I conceive that those *actions*, which a man is said to do upon *deliberation*, are said to be *voluntarie*, and done upon *choice* and *election*, so that *voluntarie* action, and action proceeding from *election* is the same thing, and that of a *voluntarie Agent*, it is all one to say, he is *free*, and to say, he hath not made an end of *deliberating*.

Fifthly, I conceive *Libertie* to be rightly defined in this manner; *Libertie is the absence*
of

of all the impediments to Action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsecal qualitie of the Agent. As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have *libertie* to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the *libertie* to ascend, but the *faculty* or power, because the impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsecal. So also we say, he that is tied wants the *libertie* to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands, whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame

lame, because the impediment is in himself.

Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from *it self*, but from the *Action* of some other immediate *Agent* without it self. And that therefore, when first a man hath an *appetite* or *will* to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the *cause* of his *will*, is not the *will* it self, but *something* else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controverfie, that of *voluntarie* actions the *will* is the *necessarie* cause, and by this which is said, the *will* is also *caused* by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that *voluntarie* actions have all of them
neces-

necessarie causes, and therefore are *necessitated*.

Seventhly, I hold that to be a *sufficient* cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needfull to the producing of the *effect*. The same also is a *necessary* cause. For if it be possible that a *sufficient* cause shall not bring forth the *effect*, then there wanteth somewhat which was needfull to the producing of it, and so the *cause* was not *sufficient*, but if it be impossible that a *sufficient* cause should not produce the *effect*, then is a *sufficient* cause a *necessary* cause (for that is said to produce an effect *necessarily* that cannot but produce it.) Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced is produced *necessarily*,

larily, for whatsoever is produced hath had a *sufficient* cause to produce it, or else it had not been, and therefore also *voluntarie* actions are *necessitated*

Lastly, should that Ordinary Definition of a free Agent, namely, *That a free Agent is that, which, when all things are present which are needfull to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it*, implies a contradiction, and is non-sence, being as much as to say, The cause may be *sufficient*, that is to say, *necessarie*, and yet the effect shall not follow.

My

My Reasons.

For the first five points, wherein it is explicated 1. what *Spontaneity* is. 2. what *Deliberation* is. 3. what *Will*, *propension* and *appetite* is. 4. what a *free Agent* is. 5. what *Liberty* is, there can no other proof be offered but every mans own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembring what he useth in his minde, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is *Spontaneous*, a man *deliberates*; such is his *will*, that *Agent* or that action is *free*, Now he that, reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that *Deliberation*, is the consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come; that by *Spontaneity* is meant *inconsiderate action* (or else nothing is meant by it) that *will* is the last act of our *Deliberation*, that a *free Agent* is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he

he will, and that *Liberty* is, the absence of external impediments. But, to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no Argument can be sufficient, because *experience* and *matter of fact* is not verified by other mens Arguments, but by every mans own *sence* and *memory*. For example, how can it be proved that to *love* a thing and to think it *good* is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by those word? Or how can it be proved that *Eternity* is not *none* *stands* to a man that saies those words by custom, and never consider how he can conceive the thing in his minde?

Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin *without a cause*, can no other way be made known, but by trying how he

he can imagine it , but if he try, he shall finde as much reason (if there be no cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at one time as another , that, he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times which is impossible , and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then ; rather than sooner or later ; or else that it began never , but was *eternal*.

For the seventh point, which is that all *events* have *necessary* causes, it is there proved in that they have *sufficient* causes. Further let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual , as the throwing (for example.) *Ames Ace* upon a pair of dice , and see , if it must not have been *necessary* before 'twas thrown. For seeing it was thrown it had a *beginning*, and consequently a *sufficient* cause to produce it , consisting partly in the *dice* , partly in outward things , as the posture of the parts

parts of the *hand*, the measure of *force* applied by the *caster*, the posture of the parts of the *Table*, and the like. In sum there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown, for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been *sufficient*. In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident how *contingent* soever it seem, or how *voluntary* soever it be, is produced *necessarily*, which is that that my L. Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. *'Tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain or not rain.* If therefore it be not *necessary* it shall rain, it is *necessary* it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, *It shall rain or not rain,* should

should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much as to say, *one* of them is *necessary*, yet *neither* of them is *necessary*, and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true *determinate*, but *indeterminate*, which distinction either signifies no more but this, One of them is true but we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not, or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, One of them is true *Titirice* but neither of them, *Tu patulice*.

The last thing in which also consisteth the whole controversie, namely that there is no such thing as an Agent, *which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless*

less forbear to produce it , or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity , is easily inferred from that which hath been before alledged. For if it be an Agent it can work , and if it work , there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action , and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient , & if sufficient , then also necessary , as hath been proved before.

And thus you see how the *inconveniences*, which his Lordship objecteth must follow upon the holding of *necessity*, are avoided, and the *necessity* it self *demonstratively* proved. To which I could add , if I thought it good *Logick*, the *inconvenience* of denying *necessity*, as that it destroyeth both the *decrees* and the *prescience* of God Almighty; for whatsoever God hath *purposed* to bring to pass by *man* , as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass , a man, if

if he have *Liberty* (such as his Lordship affirmeth) from *necessitation*, might frustrate and make not to come to pass, and *God* should either not *foreknow* it, and not *decree* it, or he should *foreknow* such things shall be, as shall never be, and *decree* that which shall never come to pass.

This is all hath come into my minde touching this question since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it onely to my Lord Bishop. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take leave and am,

My most Noble and most oblig^d Lord

Your most humble

Roven Aug. 20.

servant

1646 ~~miss.~~

Thomas Hobbs.

F I N I S.

A. 1325.